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A Fictional Tale of Unintended
Consequences

A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR WERTHEIMER

*

James A. Henderson, Jr.†
Aaron D. Twerski‡
Professor Wertheimer has provided a provocative
article,1 an ironic tale of unintended consequences. She claims
that, prior to the Products Liability Restatement, American
courts rejected the notion that manufacturers should be held
liable for not designing or warning against unknowable product
risks. In similar fashion, pre-Restatement case law insisted
that design defect claims be judged by a negligence-like riskutility balancing test. She acknowledges that the Restatement
accurately reflects the law on both of these issues. But here is
the rub. Wertheimer claims that the Restatement, by firmly
taking the majority position on these issues, inadvertently
served as a wake-up call to American courts, reminding them
that they had abandoned the true religion of strict liability and
had slipped back to negligence norms. This, she says, has
resulted in a post-Restatement backlash with courts scurrying
back to implement true strict liability. By accurately describing
what courts had been doing, the Restatement is having exactly
*
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See Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, The Third
Restatement, and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 891
(2005).
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the opposite effect from what its supporters anticipated. Talk
about unintended consequences!
We are gratified that Professor Wertheimer confirms
that the Restatement captures the thrust of developing case
law. That is what it is supposed to do. However, the rest of her
story about a backlash taking place in the courts is pure fiction.
Make no mistake—Professor Wertheimer would very much like
such a palace revolt to occur. But it has not happened and will
not take place in the future. The positions that Professor
Wertheimer and a few others have advocated for years have,
for good reason, been rejected by the overwhelming majority of
courts and scholars.
I.

IMPUTATION OF KNOWLEDGE OF UNKNOWABLE RISKS

The view that foreseeability of risk should be irrelevant
as to whether a manufacturer should bear liability for defective
design and failure to warn was the subject of short-lived but
serious debate early in the products liability era.2 However,
when actually faced with the question of whether to hold a
manufacturer liable for scientifically unknowable risks, court
after court has said “No.”3 Wertheimer cites two cases to
support her view that a revolt on this issue is afoot—one from
Wisconsin4 and the other from Montana.5 Wisconsin has long
been the lone star state in our products liability law, marching
to its own, sometimes quite peculiar, drummer.6 The Montana
court acknowledges that it rejects both Section 402A and the
Third Restatement.7 On the other side of the issue, Wertheimer
does admit in a footnote that Massachusetts, relying on the
2

See generally Symposium, The Passage of Time: The Implications of
Product Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (1983).
3
For a comprehensive discussion of the development of the case law and
academic commentary, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m
and reporters’ notes at 101-07 (1998).
4
Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 743-51 (Wis. 2001).
5
Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1144-47 (Mont. 1997).
6
See, e.g., Sumnicht v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 360 N.W.2d 2, 12
(Wis. 1984) (finding that it was erroneous to instruct a jury in a crashworthiness case
that in order to recover, a plaintiff must have suffered injuries over and above those
that he would have sustained had the design not been defective). The Wisconsin view is
contrary to section 16 of the Product Liability Restatement and is inconsistent with the
majority of case law throughout the country. See, e.g., Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc.,
761 A.2d 477, 481 (N.H. 2000). See also Greiten v. LaDow, 235 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Wis.
1975) (“[T]here may be recovery for the negligent design of a product even though it is
not unreasonably dangerous in the 402A sense.”) (erroneously labeled as concurring
opinion since four members of a seven member court voted for the concurring opinion).
7
Sternhagen, 935 P.2d at 1142, 1147.
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Products Liability Restatement, recently reversed its earlier
position applying strict liability without foreseeability.8 But she
does not tell the reader that in doing so the court said that it
had been “among a distinct minority of States that applies a
hindsight analysis to the duty to warn. . . . The goal of the law
is to induce conduct that is capable of being performed. The
goal is not advanced by imposing liability for failure to warn of
risks that were not capable of being known.”9
Professor David Owen in his excellent new hornbook on
the law of Products Liability puts the issue nicely. He says that
“but for a few rogue jurisdictions, American products liability
law, like the law of most of Europe and Japan, no longer holds
manufacturers responsible for unknowable product risks. The
rise and fall of the duty to warn of unforeseeable hazards has
played a decisive role in the more general rise and fall of ‘strict’
products liability in America . . . .”10 A decision from a renegade
jurisdiction and another from a court that rejects both the
Second and Third Restatement do not constitute a revolt. They
represent hardly a ripple in literally an ocean of authority to
the contrary.
II.

RISK-UTILITY V. CONSUMER EXPECTATIONS AS THE TEST
FOR DEFECTIVE DESIGN

It is no surprise that Professor Wertheimer is a fan of
the consumer expectations test and views the Restatement
requirement that in most cases plaintiff must establish a
reasonable alternative design as reneging on the promise of
true strict liability. The support for her position is terribly thin.
First, she argues that rejecting consumer expectations as an
independent grounds for establishing liability in design defect
cases was a clever method of insulating manufacturers from
liability for unknowable risk. One would think that any fair
application of the consumer expectations test would have
pointed in the opposite direction. Consumers would be hard put
to demonstrate an expectation that a product would protect
against risks that were unknowable or would incorporate
alternative designs that were not contemplated by any
manufacturer at the time of sale. Indeed, a rather famous early
8

Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 911 n.68 (citing Vassallo v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 910, 922-23 (Mass. 1992)).
9
Vassallo, 696 N.E.2d at 922-23.
10
DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 10.4, at 700 (2005).
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consumer expectations case took that very position. In Bruce v.
Martin-Marietta Corp.,11 an airplane manufactured by the
defendant crashed into a mountain, causing seats in the
passenger cabin to break loose from their floor attachments
and block the exit. More than half the passengers were trapped
in the airplane and died in the ensuing fire. Although the seats
conformed to existing standards when the plane had been
manufactured seventeen years earlier, plaintiffs submitted
affidavits from a recognized expert that airplane seats in
common use on the date of the accident would have remained
in place and thus would have allowed the passengers to escape.
The court rejected the claim that a plane, sold seventeen years
before the accident, failed to meet consumer expectations for
safety. In upholding summary judgment for defendant, the
Tenth Circuit said:
A consumer would not expect a Model T to have the safety features
which are incorporated in automobiles made today . . . . Plaintiffs
have not shown that the ordinary consumer would expect a plane
made in 1952 to have the safety features of one made in 1970.12

Returning to her thesis that courts that have faced the
design defect issue post-Restatement have opted for the
consumer expectations test, Professor Wertheimer trots out
Wisconsin13 and Kansas14 as two states whose case law has
soundly rejected the Restatement test. Neither Wisconsin nor
Kansas represents a backlash to the Restatement. In our
Reporters’ Note to the Restatement, we discuss both the
Wisconsin and Kansas case law and recognize that both follow
the consumer expectations test.15 It hardly comes as a surprise
that these two states have continued their past allegiance to
that test. They certainly do not support her thesis of a
backlash. The new Restatement merely gave them a forum to
express their strong allegiance to the minority view.
Conspicuously absent from the Wertheimer article is citation to
a whole host of decisions applying risk-utility balancing and/or
the reasonable alternative design standard to design defect
11

544 F.2d 442, 447 (10th Cir. 1976) (applying Oklahoma law).
Id. at 447.
Werthemier, supra note 1, at 927-28, 929-31 (citing Green v. Smith &
Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 742, 743-51, 754-55 (Wis. 2001)).
14
Werthemier, supra note 1, at 931-35 (citing Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999
P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000)).
15
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d and reporters’
notes at 67, 76 (1998).
12
13
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litigation in the post-Restatement era.16 In actual fact, these are
the states that had been embracing a risk-utility approach to
product design, and they have expressed no backlash sentiment
whatever. Nor is Wertheimer’s statement that the Restatement
completely eliminates consumer expectations from the test for
defective design accurate. Section 2, Comment h says quite
clearly that consumer expectations “may substantially
influence or even be ultimately determinative on risk-utility
balancing.”17 Admittedly, several states allow a two-pronged
test for defective design.18 A plaintiff can establish liability
under either consumer expectations or risk-utility. But, those
cases make it clear that the consumer expectations test can
work only when a product fails to perform its intended
function.19 When trade-offs have to be considered, risk-utility
must be employed.20 The Restatement does not disagree. It
allows a plaintiff to draw an inference of defect when common
sense indicates us that the injury would ordinarily occur as a
result of product defect.21 In short, risk-utility balancing is alive
16

See, e.g., Wankier v. Crown Equip. Co., 353 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir. 2003)
(applying Utah law and requiring plaintiff to prove “safer, feasible alternative design”);
Peck v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 237 F.3d 614, 619 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Michigan
law and upholding summary judgment for defendant due to plaintiff’s failure to
present sufficient evidence of reasonable alternative design); Cohen v. Winnebago
Indus., Inc., 2000 WL 299459 at *4 (4th Cir. 2000) (applying South Carolina law and
holding that “providing evidence of the existence of an alternative safer, feasible design
is part of the plaintiff’s product liability case under South Carolina law); Rypkema v.
Time Mfg. Co., 263 F. Supp. 2d 687, 692 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“Under New York law, in a
design defect case a plaintiff is required to prove the existence of a feasible alternative
[design] which would have prevented the accident.”); Jeter ex rel. Estate of Smith v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F. Supp. 2d 681, 686 (W.D. Pa. 2003)
(requiring plaintiff to prove “a feasible alternative design”); Jones v. Nordictrack, Inc.,
550 S.E.2d 101, 103-04 (Ga. 2001) (citing the Third Restatement § 2 and
acknowledging that under risk-utility standards, “[t]he ‘heart’ of a design defect case is
the reasonableness of selecting from among alternative product designs and adopting
the safer feasible one.”); Wright v. Brooke Group, Ltd., 652 N.W.2d 159, 169 (Iowa
2002) (adopting reasonable attempt in design standard for defective design).
17
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (1998).
18
See, e.g., Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 307-08 (Cal. 1994);
Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1333-34 (Conn. 1997).
19
See, e.g., Soule, 882 P.2d at 307-08; Chicago Pneumatic Tool, 694 A.2d at
1333-34.
20
See, e.g., Soule, 882 P.2d at 307-08; Chicago Pneumatic Tool, 694 A.2d at
1333-34.
21
Section 3 of the Third Restatement provides:
It may be inferred that the harm sustained by the plaintiff was caused by a
product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution, without proof of a
specific defect, when the incident that harmed the plaintiff:
(a) was of a kind that ordinarily occurs as a result of product defect;
and
(b) was not, in the particular case, solely the result of causes other
than product defect existing at the time of sale or distribution.
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and well. A true consumer expectations test remains as it was,
the darling of a small minority of states.
III.

CATEGORY LIABILITY

Wertheimer saves her guns for her long-standing
concern, the rejection by the Restatement of category liability.22
By requiring proof of a reasonable alternative design, the
Restatement rejects the notion that courts should perform
macro risk-utility balancing and declare products that cannot
be made safer and whose warnings adequately portray risks
attendant to their use to be defective. She says that the goal of
requiring a reasonable alternative design was clearly
retrogressive in that “[u]nder the [] Restatement,
manufacturers would only be liable for products with curable
dangers, and never for product designs that could not be
changed to reduce or eliminate hazards.”23 We have two
observations about her views. First, it is not true under the
Restatement that courts are “never” to declare that a product
category fails risk-utility norms. Section 2 Comment e
specifically addresses the possibility of liability without
establishing a reasonable alternative design when a product
has low social utility and a high degree of danger.24 Second, and
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 (1998).
22
See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product Category
Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV.
1429, 1442 (1994).
23
Wertheimer, supra note 1, at 934.
24
The text of comment e provides:
Design defects: possibility of manifestly unreasonable design. Several courts
have suggested that the designs of some products are so manifestly
unreasonable, in that they have low social utility and high degree of danger,
that liability should attach even absent proof of a reasonable alternative
design. In large part the problem is one of how the range of relevant
alternative designs is described. For example, a toy gun that shoots hard
rubber pellets with sufficient velocity to cause injury to children could be
found to be defectively designed within the rule of Subsection (b). Toy guns
unlikely to cause injury would constitute reasonable alternatives to the
dangerous toy. Thus, toy guns that project ping-pong balls, soft gelatin
pellets, or water might be found to be reasonable alternative designs to a toy
gun that shoots hard pellets. However, if the realism of the hard-pellet gun,
and thus its capacity to cause injury, is sufficiently important to those who
purchase and use such products to justify the court’s limiting consideration to
toy guns that achieve realism by shooting hard pellets, then no reasonable
alternative will, by hypothesis, be available. In that instance, the design
feature that defines which alternatives are relevant—the realism of the hardpellet gun and thus its capacity to injure—is precisely the feature on which
the user places value and of which the plaintiff complains. If a court were to
adopt this characterization of the product, and deem the capacity to cause
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more important, we challenge Professor Wertheimer to find a
case where a court has actually found liability based on her
notion that the product creates more risk than utility when
there was no way to make the product safer. What products
would she include on her list? Certainly not productive
machinery. How about SUV’s or motorcycles? The authors will
admit to a strong personal dislike for motorcycles. They are
death traps on wheels. But, would any court consider, even for
an instant, declaring these products to be defective because
they disturb a jury’s notion that they score too high on the
misery scale? And why not alcoholic beverages? The societal
toll taken by alcohol is mind-boggling. Is it because martinis
are too deeply ingrained in our culture? That leaves only
tobacco. But here, too, courts have not taken on the issue of
cigarettes as a defective product. The cases have proceeded
under either failure to warn or fraud and misrepresentation,
not under the theory that cigarettes themselves are per se
unreasonably dangerous.25 For reasons that we have detailed
elsewhere, American courts have avoided product category like
the plague.26 The Restatement reflected and continues to reflect
the overwhelming consensus on this issue. There is no
backlash. None whatsoever.
IV.

THE RESTATEMENT IS NEITHER PRO-DEFENDANT NOR
PRO-PLAINTIFF

Professor Wertheimer and a handful of other critics
portray the Third Restatement as pro-defendant. We would
urge them to read both the Restatement and the developing
case law more carefully. A strong case can be made that
plaintiffs have utilized the Restatement and the positions it
espouses more successfully than defendants. Examples abound.

injury an egregiously unacceptable quality in a toy for use by children, it
could conclude that liability should attach without proof of a reasonable
alternative design. The court would declare the product design to be defective
and not reasonably safe because the extremely high degree of danger posed
by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible social
utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant facts,
would choose to use, or to allow children to use, the product.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998).
25
See, e.g., Williams v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 48 P.3d 824, 49 (Or. Ct. App.
2002) (proceeding under fraud theory).
26
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1263, 1300-14 (1991).
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(1) Warnings Cannot Cure a Defective Design. One of
the unfortunate legacies of Restatement, Second, Comment j
was that a product whose dangers are adequately warned
against is not defective in design.27 The authors and others
found this position untenable. The Third Restatement puts this
issue to rest. Section 2, Comment l says that “when a safer
design can reasonably be implemented and risks can
reasonably be designed out of a product, adoption of the safer
design is required over a warning that leaves a significant
residuum of such risk.”28 Several high-profile cases have taken
this position much to the chagrin of manufacturers who sought
to absolve themselves from liability because they had
thoroughly warned against the dangers.29
(2) An Inference of Defect May be Drawn Without Proof
of Specific Defect. Courts had questioned the applicability of
the negligence res ipsa doctrine to strict liability cases.30 The
Restatement takes the position that res ipsa is fully analogous
and that one can draw an inference of defect when the incident
that harmed the plaintiff was of a kind that ordinarily occurs
as a result of product defect.31 Plaintiff need not establish
whether the defect stemmed from design or from faulty
manufacture and thus is not required to introduce a reasonable
alternative design to establish a prima facie case of defect.32
This is another provision in the Restatement upon which courts
have relied to the great advantage of plaintiffs.33
27

Section 402A, comment j provides:
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be
read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use
if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably
dangerous.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (1965).
28
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. l (1998).
29
Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 334-37 (Tex.
1998); Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 144 F.3d 841, 844-45 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Lewis v.
American Cyanamid Co., 715 A.2d 967, 982 (N.J. 1998).
30
Welge v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 17 F.3d 209, 211 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying
Illinois law). The court held:
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur teaches that an accident that is unlikely to
occur unless the defendant was negligent is itself circumstantial evidence
that the defendant was negligent. The doctrine is not strictly applicable to a
product liability case because unlike an ordinary accident case the defendant
in a products case has parted with possession and control of the harmful
object before the accident occurs.
Id.
31
See text of § 3 supra note 21.
32
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 3 cmt. b (1998).
33
See, e.g., Speller v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 N.E.2d 252, 254-55 (N.Y.
2003); Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 723 A.2d 45, 57 (N.J. 1999).
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(3) Violation of Safety Statutes and Regulations is
Dispositive for Plaintiffs; Compliance is Not Dispositive for
Defendants. Section 4 of the Third Restatement takes a onesided position. Violation of statute or regulation renders a
product defective. On the other hand, compliance with a
statute or regulation is not dispositive. A defendant may
introduce evidence of compliance but compliance does not
preclude a finder of fact from a finding that a product is
defective.
(4) Product Distributors Owe Post-Sale Duties to Warn.
Section 10 of the Third Restatement sets forth the structure for
the imposition of a post-sale failure to warn. Some courts have
resisted recognizing a duty to warn of after-discovered risks
when the product was not defective at time of sale.34 Once again
courts have relied on the factors set forth in Section 10 and will
recognize a post-sale duty when the facts indicate that the
factors have been met.35 By creating a coherent structure the
Restatement has allayed the fears that a post-sale duty to warn
will result in unbridled liability.
(5) Plaintiffs Receive the Benefit of the Doubt in
Crashworthiness Cases. For years courts debated whether a
plaintiff who could not establish the amount of increased
damages caused by a defect in an auto that rendered it
uncrashworthy could recover from a defendant who caused
some add-on injury to that which the plaintiff would otherwise
have suffered.36 Section 16 of the Restatement takes the
position that once plaintiff has proved that a defect caused
some increased harm but the full extent of the harm cannot be
determined, the auto manufacturer is liable for the entirety of
the damages. We are pleased that every court that has faced
the issue post-Restatement has adopted Section 16.37

34

See, e.g., McLennan v. Am. Eurocopter Corp., 245 F.3d 403, 429 (5th Cir.
2001) (applying Texas law); Modelski v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 707 N.E.2d 239
(Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
35
See, e.g., Lovick v. Wil-Rich, 588 N.W.2d 688, 693-96 (Iowa 1999) (adopting
§ 10); Lewis v. Ariens Co., 751 N.E.2d 862, 867 (Mass. 2001) (adopting § 10).
36
For a review of the authority pro and con on this issue, see the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 16 cmt. d and reporters’ notes at 243-53
(1998).
37
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1219-20 (Alaska 1998);
Lally v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 36-37 (Mass. Application. Ct.
1998); Poliseno v. Gen. Motors Corp., 744 A.2d 679, 686 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2000); Green v. Gen. Motors Corp., 709 A.2d 205, 214-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1998); cert. denied, 718 A.2d 1210 (N.J. 1998); Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 761
A.2d 477 (N.H. 2000).
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The list goes on. In drafting the Restatement, we did not
seek to trade off one issue against the other. We endeavored
only to reflect the law as it was developing and to ask ourselves
whether the result was fair. In a Restatement that has twentyone sections and one hundred and thirty-three comments, it is
not surprising that some courts will differ on one or another
rule or comment. But the world is not as Professor Wertheimer
would have her readers see it. As intriguing as her ironic tale
of unintended consequences may be, it is an imaginative work
of fiction.

